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ABSTRACT
The present study was an attempt to apply Festinger's
(1955) theory of Social Comparison to the modeling of amount
of self-reinforcement. The three major independent vari-
ables in the study were model similarity (similar versus
dissimilar), type of task instructions (patterned versus
random order), and correct trials in a 2 x 2 x 10 repeated
measures design. Subjects were asked to make predictions
concerning which of two lights on a panel before them would
be illuminated. Subjects were informed that the illumina-
tion of the lights would follow either a patterned or random
order. Subjects were also told that they v/ould view another
subject (a model) who would demonstrate the apparatus via
video tape. The model was described to the subject as
either similar or dissimilar to the subject in attitude con-
cerning the importance of doing well on the task. On the
basis of Social Comparison theory, it was predicted that
there v/ould be more modeling of the similar model than the
dissimilar model when the task instructions stated a pat-
terned order to the illumination of the lights. Also, it
was predict 2d that there would be no differences in modeling
between the similar and dissimilar model groups when the
task instructions stated a random order to the illumination
of the lights. Subjects performed a series of twenty trials.
vii
On half of the trials, subjects received feedback that they
were correct. Data were analyzed for sixty subjects with
fifteen subjects in each cell. Only the main effect of
trials was found to be significant. Reasons for the fail-
ure of this study to yield significant results and sugges-
tions for future research are presented.
1INTRODUCTION
Problem
This study, to be described below, attempted to
specify some situations v/hich limit the modeling of amount
of self-reinforcement. There is abundant evidence to be
reviewed below that subjects will adopt a standard for self-
reinforcement displayed by a model. However, there is very
little known about those situations where the subject will
ignore the self-reinforcement standard of the model. Bandura
(1971) has pointed out that there are situations where
another person is inappropriate as a source of cues for
determining whether or not a performance is deserving of
self-reinforcement. For example, it is not likely that a
weekend golfer would adopt the standards of an Arnold Palmer
in determining whether or not his score v/as deserving of
self-praise. Likewise, if there were some objective, non-
social cues for determining task success it is unlikely that
one would adopt the self-reinforcement standards of another
person. The present study, utilizing predictions based on
Festinger's (1955) Social Comparison theory, attempted to
delineate situations in which the subject either adopted or
ignored the standards established by a model. However, be-
fore developing this line of reasoning, it is necessary to
review both the theoretical issues and the current research
concerning self-reinforcement.
Self-reinforcement
To date there has been little or no attempt to empiri-
cally investigate the uses of self-reinforcement. On the
applied level, Bandura (1971) has noted that there may be a
relationship between self-reinforcement and psychopathology.
According to his view, deviant behaviors may be maintained
through the use of self-reinforcement. Thus, many behaviors
which appear to be resistant to both the traditional psycho-
analytic and current behavior modification therapies may be
resistant because they are maintained by the patient through
the judicious use of some form of self
-reinforcement. On a
more theoretical level, self-reinforcement may help to main-
tain behaviors undergoing experimental extinction. For
example, it is known that partial reinforcement schedules
are more resistant to extinction than are continuous rein-
forcement schedules. It is conceivable that an individual
being shaped on a partial reinforcement schedule provides
himself with some type of self-reinforcement, regardless of
its nature, on those trials where no direct reinforcement is
given. Then, during extinction, the experimental subject
can use self-reinforcement to maintain his behavior. The
greater efficacy of partial reinforcement schedules over
continuous reinforcement can be explained, using this analysis,
3by arguing that partial reinforcement schedules force the
subject to learn some type of self-reinforcement response
during acquisition while the continuous reinforcement sched-
ules do not. Obviously, as will be noted shortly, such a
position is an anathema to researchers trained in the oper-
ant tradition. However, such a position is at least plausi-
ble. Regardless of v/hether or not self
-reinforcement can
be applied to the situations mentioned above, it is impor-
tant to decide whether or not the phenomenon of self-
reinforcement is useful and moreover, one must decide
whether or not self-reinforcement , if it is useful, is
really reinforcement.
Theoretical issues . Marston (1965, p. 255) has de-
fined self-reinforcement as . . the administration of
reinforcement by the subject to himself, without external
controls." Bandura (1971) has argued that self-reinforcement
is a theoretical concept and deserves research attention.
He notes, as mentioned earlier, the use of self-reinforcement
in the maintenance of deviant behaviors. In addition,
Bandura argues that self-reinforcement is the process by
which individuals control their ovm behaviors in the absence
of direct reinforcement. Gewirtz (1971), on the other hand,
doubts v/hether the terra self-reinforcement is useful and
whether or not self-reinforcement exists as a phenomenon.
According to his view, self-reinforcement is nothing more
than the maintenance of a behavior through the use of
intermittent direct reinforcement. Gewirtz bases his argu-
ments on Bandura's statement that self-reinforcement is only
relatively independent of extrinsic reinforcement. Gewirtz»s
operant analysis argues that because self-reinforcement is
only relatively independent of extrinsic reinforcement the
behaviors that self-reinforcement maintain are, in fact,
maintained by this intermittent direct reinforcement. Thus,
Gewirtz argues for two reasons that Bandura*s conception of
self-reinforcement is unnecessary. Firstly, research on
self-reinforcement lacks sufficient controls to account for
previous conditioning history, and therefore, evidence for
the phenomenon of self-reinforcement as a unique phenomenon
is lacking. Secondly, the use of terms such as self-
reinforcement is not parsimonious. This latter argument
states that intermittent direct reinforcement can account
for the behaviors maintained supposedly by self-reinforcement,
and that the concept of intermittent direct reinforcement
has some basis in operant theory while self-reinforcement
has no such theoretical basis. At this point it is impos-
sible to accept one position over the other on the basis of
the data. Both approaches make the same predictions. More-
over, there appears to be no feasible empirical test pitting
the Bandura and Gewirtz approaches against one another. Hov^-
ever, an even deeper issue remains unresolved. Is self-
reinforcement really reinforcement?
Hilgard and Bower (1966) note that reinforcement is
commonly considered to be any event which increases the
5probability of a given response. However, in the research
on self-reinforcement there is generally no empirical test
of whether or not the use of self
-reinforcement will alter
the probability of a response. For example, Kanfer and
Marston (1963) have investigated the use of self-
reinforcement in a verbal discrimination task. In this
study there is no empirical test of whether or not self-
reinforcement alters the probability of any response since
self-reinforcement itself is the response under considera-
tion. In the research on the modeling of self
-reinforcement
(Bandura and Kupers, 1964; Bandura and V/halen, 1966; Liebert
and Ora, 1968; Mischel and Liebert, 1966) the experimenters
are interested in whether or not a subject can acquire a
standard for self
-reinforcement by observing a model. In
this research there is no modification in the subject's
behavior as a function of whether or not he used some type
of self-reinforcement since the acquisition of a standard
for self-reinforcement was the dependent measure. In addi-
tion, the subject's scores for his performance were con-
trolled by the experimenter. Such evidence would argue
that self-reinforcement does not qualify as reinforcement.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that self-
reinforcement, while not altering the probability of a
response, can maintain a learned response at the learned
level. Marston and Kanfer (1963) have utilized a verbal
discrimination task where subjects were asked to select one
6of four nonsense syllables. If the subject selected the
correct syllable, he was reinforced. After a series of
acquisition trials, the subject either continued with direct
reinforcement (continued acquisition), was given control
over his reinforcement (self-reinforcement), or was given
no reinforcement (extinction). It was found that there was
increased learning for the continued acquisition group, a
reduction in correct responding for the extinction group,
and neither a reduction nor increased learning for the self-
reinforcement group. It is important to note that the self-
reinforcement group was able to maintain the previous level
of learning. The Marston and Kanfer (1963) study would
appear to indicate that self
-reinforcement does qualify as
a reinforcement as defined earlier.
Part of the problem of whether or not self-reinforcement
qualifies as reinforcement lies in the fact that researchers
have confused reinforcement with a class of events labeled
reinforcement. For example, various events labeled reinforce-
ment such as lights (Marston, I96I; Marston and Kanfer, 1963;
Kanfer and Marston, I963), the word "good" (Marston, 1963),
candy (Bandura and Kupers, 1964; Bandura and Whalen, 1966;
Mischel and Liebert, 1966), chips to be exchanged for prizes
(Marston, 196l; Bandura and Perloff, 1968; Liebert and Ora,
1968), and a rating scale (Marston, 1961) have been used as
reinforcements under the subject's own control. Unfortu-
nately, none of the above experimental designs test whether
7or not these supposed reinforcers actually modify the proba-
bilities of any response. Without empirical tests, it is
difficult to determine whether or not these events are, in ^
fact, reinforcements. Future research should be conducted
which will test the effectiveness of self-reinforcement on
behaviors such as those described by Bandura (1971) earlier
in this paper.
Previous research
. At this point, it is relevant to
review the previous research on self-reinforceraent . To date
there have been two approaches to the study of self-
reinforcement; one concerned with the effect of self-
reinforcement after it has been acquired through direct
training, and the other concerned with the modeling of
standards for self-reinforcement. While the latter approach
is of more direct relevance to the research to be presented,
it is important to briefly reviev/ the former.
In the Kanfer and Marston (1963) study mentioned
earlier, accuracy of the use of self-reinforcement was
investigated. Subjects performed a verbal discrimination
task under one of three incentive conditions and one of
three reinforcement procedures. It was found that con-
tinued direct reinforcement led to increased learning of
the reinforced response, self-reinforcement led to the main-
tenance of the previously learned response, and extinction
led to a decrement in the learned response. While the high
incentive condition group most accurately administered self-
reinforcement to the previously rewarded responses, incen-
tive itself failed to affect the frequency of self-
reinforcement. Kanfer and Marston (I963) investigated
different variables influencing the accuracy and frequency
of self-reinforcement. Using the verbal discrimination task
described earlier, the experimenters manipulated (1) the
stage of prior learning before introducing self-reinforcement,
(2) the stringency of the instructions concerning the admin-
istration of self-reinforcement, and (3) the similarity of
the experimental stimuli in the acquisition and test phases
of the experiment. It was found that (1) the greater the
stage of prior learning, the more accurate subjects were in
the administration of self-reinforcement, (2) the greater
the stringency concerning the administration of self-
reinforcement, the less frequently self-reinforcement was
used, and (3) changing the experimental stimuli from the
acquisition to the test phase resulted in a reduction in the
number of previously rewarded responses.
In another study concerned with the use of self-
reinforcement, Bandura and Perloff (1968) found that self-
reinforcement can maintain an effortful response. In this
study, children turned a crank a number of turns in order
to earn points. The subjects then selected a criterion num-
ber of points as a cut-off for self-reinforcement. A second
group of subjects had the criterion of the first group im-
posed on them. The results of the study indicated that both
9self- and externally controlled reinforcement served to
maintain the cranking response.
Thus, one is led to the second type of self-
reinforcement research, that concerned with the modeling of
self-reinforcement. As mentioned in the beginning of this
paper, the research on the modeling of self
-reinforcement,
be it rate, standard, or amoiint, leaves one with the impres-
sion that one always adopts the self-reinforcement behavior
of a model. Obviously, as the example of the golfer indi-
cated, there are times when an individual uses cues other
than the behavior of a model in order to determine his own
self-reinforcing behavior. It was pointed out that Festin-
ger's (1955) theory of Social Comparison might be useful in
helping to specify when the model's self-reinforcing behavior
is adopted and when it is rejected. In order to demonstrate
the feasibility of the Social Comparison formulation it is
necessary to first review the postulates of Social Compari-
son theory and then to demonstrate its relevance to the cur-
rent research on the modeling of self-reinforcement.
Social Comparison Theory
Festinger (1955) has postulated a need for self-
evaluation by which an individual compares himself with
another in terras of ability and/or opinions. Festinger
notes that when objective, non-social cues for determining
the correctness of one's abilities and/or opinions are
10
absent one compares himself with others. The comparison
other is appropriate to the extent that the abilities and/or
opinions of the comparison other are similar to those of th&
individual. The less the similarity in abilities and/or
opinions, the less likely the other will be deemed an appro-
priate comparison person. There are two basic independent
variables in an experimental test of the Festinger formula-
tion. They are the degree to which objective, non-social
cues for comparison are present and the similarity in abili-
ty and/or opinion between the individual and the comparison
other. As will be shown, the research on the modeling of
self-reinforcement standards often contains no objective,
non-social cue by which the subject can determine whether
or not his performance is deserving of self-reinforcement.
In addition, the model can generally be assumed to be simi-
lar in ability and/or opinion. Thus, there is ample reason
to believe that the Social Comparison theory predictions are
relevant to the self-reinforcement literature.
Bandura (1971) states that a self
-reinforcing event
involves social comparison processes. He notes that there
are four subsidiary processes in a self
-reinforcing event.
The first process involves the establishment of a standard
by which tne individual evaluates the adequacy of his per-
formance. The second involves a comparison by the individual
with appropriate others to determine the meaning of his per-
formance in relation to others. The third process involves
11
the knowledge that the self-reinforcements are under the
individual's control, and the fourth process is the adminis-
tration of those reinforcers to himself. In terms of the
social comparison process, there appear to be four steps in
the self-reinforcement sequence. The first is the decision
of whether or not to perform. It is highly unlikely that a
violin student v/ill attempt to perform the same difficult
composition performed by the master. In this situation, the
behavior which might be potentially self
-reinforced is not
even attempted. Assuming that the student decides to per-
form the task, the second step concerns the performance it-
self. Is the student's performance like that of the violin
master? In the third step, the individual must decide if
his performance is deserving of self-reinforcement. If the
student decides that his performance is equal to that of the
master, he may deem the performance worthy of self-
reinforcement and then administer it to himself. At this
point the self-reinforcement sequence is complete. However,
it is possible to reverse the roles of the student and the
teacher in the above example. While it is probable that the
master will be able to match the performance of the student,
it is unlikely that the master will administer self-
reinforcement for such a match. In this case the behavior
probably is not deemed v;orthy of self-reinforcement. Never-
theless, it does point out that self-reinforcement may be
neither deserved nor administered if the task is perceived
as too simple.
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The final decision of whether or not to administer
self-reinforcement is of interest to most researchers. The
decision of whether or not to perform is generally excluded
by the experimental situation and the task is generally de-
signed so that the performance of the subject matches that
of the model. As will be noted shortly, the decision of
whether or not the performance is deserving of self-
reinforcement may be expanded to include the question of
how much self
-reinforcement is deserved.
Modeling of self
-reinforcement
To date there have been two basic types of studies
concerned with the modeling of standards for self-
reinforcement. The first, exemplified by Marston (1965),
is concerned with the adoption of the model's rate of self-
reinforcement. Subjects were asked to respond v;ith the
word "good" as a verbal reinforcer whenever they felt that
they had responded with the most popular word association to
a stimulus word. After measuring a base rate of self-
reinforcement, subjects were exposed to a model via audio
tape. High versus lovi rate of self-reinforcement of the
model was varied by having the model either increase his
rate of self-reinforcement over trial blocks (high rate) or
maintain a constant rate of self-reinforcement over trial
blocks (low rate). In addition, there was a control group
which did not hear a model. The situation v/as a co-learning
13
task where the subject and the model alternated giving re-
sponses. The degree to which the subject overtly responded
was also varied. In one condition, the subjects responded
with both the word association and self
-reinforcement. In
the second condition, subjects did not verbalize any self-
reinforcement while in a third group subjects gave neither
word associations nor self-reinforcement . The results indi-
cated that the high and low rate groups differed from the
control group even though they did not differ from one an-
other. This finding is indicative of a general modeling
influence. The degree of overt responding failed to yield
a main effect, indicating that overt responding is not neces-
sary to obtain imitation of the model's rate of self-
reinforcement. In terms of the Social Comparison analysis,
one would expect to find the model having some influence
since there were no objective, non-social cues for deter-
mining task success in this study. The only v/ay in which
the subject could evaluate his own performance was in terms
of the model's performance. Since there was no reason for
the subject to infer any differences in ability and/or opin-
ion to perform the task, the subject would probably feel
that his responses were as correct as the model's and thus
deserving of reward. Therefore, there would be a tendency
to reward oneself about as often as the model rewarded him-
self yielding a main effect of model's rate of self-
reinforcement. This particular study appears to be amenable
to a Social Comparison analysis.
14
The second type of research in the self
-reinforcement
literature concerns the adoption of specific criterion lev-
els for self-reinforcement. In this line of research with
children, investigators have utilized the miniature bowling
game where a subject collects points for knocking down pins
(Bandura and Kupers, 1964; Bandura and V/halen, 1966; Liebert
and Ora, 196B; Mischel and Liebert, 1966). Since the end
of the alley was shielded, the experimenter provided feed-
back to the subject which indicated how many points the sub-
ject collected on each trial. This arrangement allowed the
experimenter to vary the points awarded to the subject to
fit the experimental design. The model performed first and
awarded himself candy (Bandura and Kupers, 1964; Bandura
and V/halen, 1966) or chips to be exchanged for prizes
(Liebert and Ora, 196B; Mischel and Liebert, 1966) for
scores above a criterion level. Then the subject performed
in the absence of the model to reduce situational pressures
for conformity to the model's standard. In general, these
studies found that children would adopt the standard for
self-reinforcement displayed by the model. In addition,
Bandura and Kupers (1964) found that adult models were more
efficacious in transmitting these standards than peer models.
Liebert and Ora (1968) found that modeling and direct train-
ing were equally effective in transmitting the self-
reinforcement standard. They also found that there was
greater violation of the standard v/hen the prizes to be
15
awarded for the chips were attractive than when they were
not attractive. Mischel and Liebert (1966) found that sub-
jects would adopt a more lenient criterion for self-
reinforcement if there was a discrepancy between that
adopted by the model and that which the model imposed on
the subject. However, when both the modeled and the imposed
criteria were stringent, the subject would adopt and con-
tinue to maintain the stringent criterion. Finally, Bandura
and V/halen (1966) have found that subjects will not adopt
the criterion level for self
-reinforcement displayed by the
model if that criterion is highly divergent from the sub-
ject's own abilities as demonstrated in an earlier task.
Neither the Mischel and Liebert (1966) nor the Liebert and
Ora (196B) study provided a test of the Social Comparison
postulates. Generally, the miniature bowling game can be
seen as a perceived test of skill. The subject does not
know that the experimenter is controlling the scores that
he and the model receive. Moreover, the score in and of
itself is meaningless. The child learns what the score he
receives means in terms of reinforcement by comparing his
score with that of the model. If the child's score exceeds
that score for v/hich the model has rewarded himself, the
child appears to deem that score as deserving of reward.
Since the subject received scores as high as those obtained
by the model, there is little or no reason for the subject
to infer that the model has greater competence. Therefore,
16
it should make little or no difference whether the model is
an adult or a child. In three of these studies (Bandura
and V/halen, 1966; Liebert and Ora, 196B; Mischel and Liebert,
1966), there is no test of this hypothesis since there is
only one model, an adult. Hov/ever, in the Bandura and
Kupers (1964) study, there is a test of whether or not adult
and peer models are equally effective in transmitting self-
reinforcement standards.
In the Bandura and Kupers (1964) study, the children
viewed either an adult model or a peer model playing the
miniature bowling game. In addition, the model adopted
either a high or a low criterion level for self
-reinforcement.
Although the subjects generally adopted the criterion level
displayed, there vias a more precise match in the adult model
condition than in the peer model condition. Since, as argued
above, there is no reason for the subject to perceive that
the adult had greater ability, this finding is contrary to
that predicted on the basis of Social Comparison theory.
Two different lines of reasoning help to make the above con-
trary finding more understandable. Firstly, the adult may
be perceived as more knowledgeable in terms of how many
points are necessary before self-reinforcement is deserved.
Were this the case, then one would expect a more precise
match v/ith the adult's standard because of the supposed
greater knowledge of the adult. Secondly, it is possible
that the perceived power of the adult model yielded the
17
greater effectiveness of the adult model in transmitting
the standard. Since children model adults more than peers
(Flanders, 1968), one would expect the adult model to be
more efficacious. If peers v/ere perceived to be less power-
ful as models, one would expect to find greater violation of
peer standards. In fact, Bandura and Kupers (1964) found
greater violation of the peer model's standards. The au-
thors attempted to correct for this artifact by having the
subjects perform the task alone, thus reducing situational
pressures for conformity. However, if the children had
learned previously that they should follow the behavior of
adults more than peers due to the greater power of adults,
they may adhere to the adult model's standard even in his
absence. Therefore, while one can interpret the results of
the Bandura and Kupers (I964) study as an argument against
the Social Comparison formulation presented in this study,
it is felt that other factors as mentioned above may have
influenced the results. However, even though the Social
Comparison predictions still appear to be tenable, it should
be noted that the results of the Bandura and Kupers (1964)
study may indicate that social comparison processes may not
operate in all situations.
The Bandura and V/halen (1966) study was designed to be
a test of the Social Comparison predictions in a self-
reinforcement task. Subjects were provided with a series of
three tasks which they performed. Half of the subjects were
18
told both at the end of each task and again at the conclu-
sion of the series that they had performed at a level below
the norm for children of their age. The other half of the
subjects were informed that they had performed above the
norm. This manipulation provided a success-failure experi-
ence before watching a model play the miniature bowling
game. Then subjects observed either a superior model, an
equally competent model, or an inferior model perform. The
results indicated that the success experience subjects gen-
erally adopted the self-reinforcement standard displayed by
the equally competent model. The failure experience sub-
jects generally matched the standard of the inferior model.
The superior model was ignored. Bandura and V/halen (1966)
argue that this study demonstrates the influence of social
comparison processes in the adoption of self-reinforcement
criteria. They reason that the success-failure manipulation
created an expectancy of future performance. Thus, the
models which diverged from this expectancy were considered
inappropriate comparison persons on the basis of ability to
perform the task and rejected. While this study does pro-
vide support for the influence of social comparison processes,
it does not provide a complete test of the Social Comparison
predictions for two reasons. In the first place, the origi-
nal success-failure manipulation was based upon performance
norms for children of that age. Since norms are computed on
the basis of scores for large numbers of subjects on specific
19
criteria, the use of norms involves an explicit comparison
of the subject's score with similar other children. There-
fore, there was no objective, non-social cue with which the
subject could compare his performance. Social Comparison
theory as developed by Festinger (1955) states that one com-
pares himself with others when objective, non-social cues
are absent. In order to constitute a complete test of the
Social Comparison predictions, another group of subjects
should have had the opportunity to compare their scores
against some objective standard. In terms of the Bandura
and Whalen (1966) study, it would have been impossible to
have an objective, non-social comparison standard with the
tasks utilized. The second problem, which Bandura and
Whalen (1966) mention, concerns the confounding of model
ability with model standards for self-reinforcement. When-
ever the manipulation of model-subject similarity is accom-
plished by varying the ability of the model in relation to
that of the subject, one runs the risk of confounding model
ability with the standard he adopts. Thus, a high ability
model may only perform at or above the standard he adopts
or he will not be perceived as a high ability model. This
also holds true for an inferior ability model. However,
this also means that one is never sure if the high ability
model is rejected because he is much too able as predicted
by Social Comparison theory or because the standard adopted
by the high ability model is too stringent. In order to
20
provide an adequate test of the predictions based upon So-
cial Comparison theory, one must separate out this confound-
ing. It should be pointed out that Bandura and Whalen
(1966) noted this problem, but they felt that this confound-
ing was not important to their study. However, it is impor-
tant to a study designed to interpret self-reinforcement
effects in terms of Social Comparison predictions.
Proposed research and hypotheses
This particular study attempted to provide an adequate
test of Social Comparison predictions for self
-reinforcement
effects. On the basis of Social Comparison theory it was
argued that the similar model's self-reinforcement behavior
would be adopted more than the behavior of the dissimilar
model v/hen there were social cues available. However, there
should be no differences in amount of modeling between the
similar and dissimilar model conditions when the available
cues are objective and non-social. Subjects were asked,
after watching a model, to perform a prediction task under
two different sets of task instructions. In one condition,
subjects were told that the order of illumination of two
lights, which the subject was to predict, followed a random
order. In this condition, it was argued that subjects could
compare their performance with chance and select self-
reinforcement appropriately. V/hen the illumination of the
lights was random, the subject's predictions were either
21
right or wrong. Therefore, subjects might select either all
the self-reinforcement available or none at all depending
upon whether the subject was correct or incorrect. In the -
second task instruction condition, subjects were told that
the order of illumination of the lights followed a definite
pattern. It was argued that subjects would attempt to dis-
cover the pattern in the illumination of the lights. While
looking for this pattern, subjects would have difficulty in
determining how much self-reinforcement was appropriate.
Therefore, these subjects would tend to match the self-
reinforcement behavior of the model. The dependent measure
of amount of self-reinforcement was intended to provide some
measure of the subject's evaluation of his performance.
In addition, the confounding of model ability with
model standard was separated. Instead of manipulating the
ability discrepancy between the model and the subject, simi-
larity of attitude concerning the importance of doing well
on the task was manipulated. Berger (1971) has demonstrated
that varying the similarity of attitude between the model
and the subject is sufficient to involve social comparison
processes. Subjects in the model similar condition were
given feedback that the model agreed with their position con
cerning the importance of doing well on the task while sub-
jects in the dissimilar model condition received feedback to
the effect that the model disagreed with their position.
Interpretation of Berger* s (I97l) data would argue that
22
similarity in either ability or opinion qualifies the com-
parison other as an appropriate comparison person.
METHOD
Sub.jects
Subjects (N = 6/f) were male and female students at
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, who received extra
course credit for participation in psychological experiments.
Four of the subjects were dropped from the study before
analysis of the data either due to failure to understand
the experimental instructions or due to mechanical failure
of the apparatus. One subject each was removed from the
dissimilar model, patterned order and the similar model,
random order conditions and two subjects were removed from
the similar model, patterned order condition. The remain-
ing sixty subjects were randomly assigned to experimental
conditions, yielding fifteen subjects per cell. All sub-
jects v/ere run individually.
Procedure
Design . The study was a 2 x 2 x 10 experimental de-
sign with task instructions (patterned order versus random
order) and model similarity (similar versus dissimilar) as
the between-subjects variables and correct trials as the
within-subjects variable.
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Apparatus. The subject was shown a panel consisting
of four lights arranged in two rows of two lights, with two
buttons below the bottom row of lights. The top blue row
was labeled feedback and the bottom red row was labeled pre-
diction. The subject was required to predict which of the
two lights in the feedback row would be illuminated. His
prediction was made by pushing one of the two buttons which
illuminated the corresponding light in the prediction row.
After a delay of five seconds one of the lights in the feed-
back row was illuminated. If the light in the same column
as his prediction was illuminated, he was correct. However,
if the other light was illuminated, he was incorrect. V/hile
the panel was ostensibly connected to a relay rack containing
timers, relays, and a Talley tape reader, the illumination
of the feedback lights was under the experimenter's control.
Experimental sequence . After escorting the subject
to the experimental room, the experimenter introduced him-
self and read the following instructions:
The study you have selected is concerned with
personal motivation. Social scientists have long
been concerned with how an individual maintains
interest and attention while engaged in a repeti-
tive task. For example, assembly line workers and
air traffic controllers are required to repeat the
same task over and over. If an air traffic con-
troller loses interest in his job, an unidentified
airplane may enter his sector and a fatal crash
might result. It is knovm that some air traffic
controllers praise or criticize themselves to main-
tain interest in their job. For example, an air
traffic controller may praise himself whenever he
spots an unidentified plane entering his sector.
Or he may criticize himself whenever he fails to
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Identify a plane as it enters his sector. Some
air traffic controllers use points instead of
praise and then compare one day's point total
with another day's point total. This particular
study is an attempt to see if techniques such as
giving points really are effective in increasing
attention to a task.
What I v/ould like you to do is predict which
of the tv;o lights in the top row of the panel be-
fore you will be illuminated. If you will look
at the panel, you will see that there are two
rows of two lights. The top blue row is labeled
FEEDBACK and the bottom red row is labeled PRE-
DICTION. Below the bottom row of lights there
are two buttons. Whenever one of the buttons is
pushed, the light in the PREDICTION row above
that button will be illuminated indicating your
choice. Please push the button quickly and then
release. Never hold the button down. About five
seconds after pushing either button, one of the
lights in the FEEDBACK row will be illuminated.
If the light in the FEEDBACK row above the PRE-
DICTION light is illuminated, then you were cor-
rect. Hov/ever, if the other light is illuminated,
then you were incorrect. Notice that there is an
amber light at the top center of the panel. This
is a warning light. I control this light and it
is a signal for the trial to begin.
At the conclusion of each trial, please tell
me hov; many points you feel you deserve for your
performance on that trial. You may give yourself
as few or as many points as you feel you deserve.
However, there is one restriction. You may not
give yourself more than fifteen points for any
trial. Therefore, you may give yourself from 0
to 15 points for any trial.
The electronic equipment behind you controls
the order in v/hich the lights in the FEEDBACK
row will be illuminated.
At this point the experimenter showed the subject a
piece of punched paper tape. Then, the patterned versus
random order task instruction manipulation was introduced.
In the patterned order condition, the experimenter went on
to state:
This tape will program the apparatus so that
the illumination of the FEEDBACK lights follows a
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definite pattern. While it is a complex pattern,you should be able to notice it. '
In the random order condition, the experimenter stated:
This tape will program the apparatus so thatthe Illumination of the FEEDBACK lights is com-pletely random. Therefore, if you made enough
predictions you would be correct 50fo of the time.
However, in a brief series of trials you may be
either above or below this chance level depending
on luck. ^
Then the instructions for all subjects continued as follows:
Remember, first you will see the amber light.
When the light goes off, select either button,
push quickly and release. The illumination of
the light in the FEEDBACK row will indicate
whether or not your prediction was correct.
Finally, tell me how many points from 0 to 15
you deserve for that trial. Remember, only give
the number of points you feel you deserve for
your performance on that trial.
So that you will get an idea of how the appa-
ratus works, I am going to show you an excerpt of
a video tape of an earlier subject v/ho went through
the same procedure. However, before we start I
would like you to fill out this scale. We have
found that a subject's performance on this type
of task is influenced by how important he feels
the task is. Please indicate whether or not you
feel that doing v/ell on this task is important
to you.
The experimenter then gave the subject a questionnaire con-
sisting of a single statement. The question asked the sub-
ject if it was important to him that he do well on the
experimental task. The subject indicated his response by
checking either "yes" or "no." While the subject was com-
pleting the scale, the experimenter readied the equipment.
When the subject had finished, the experimenter picked up
the scale and casually remarked in the similar model condi-
tion:
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That's interesting. The subject you are goingto see marked the same answer.
In the dissimilar model condition, the experimenter said:
That's interesting. The subject you are going
to see marked the opposite ansv/er.
At this point the subject viewed a female model per-
form a series of 10 trials on the experimental task. When
she was correct, the model selected seven points for her
self-reinforcement. However, when she was incorrect, she
did not give herself any points. After the subject had
viewed the model, the sequence constituting a trial was re-
viewed, the subject asked if he had any questions, and the
experiment began. The subject completed a series of twenty
trials, on half of which he was given feedback that he was
correct. With I signifying incorrect and C signifying cor-
rect, the following sequence constituted the subject's
feedback: I, I, C, I, I, C, I, I, C, I, C, I, C, C, C, I,
C, C, C, I. After completing this series of twenty trials,
the subject was asked to fill out a final questionnaire.
When the questionnaire was returned, subjects were inter-
viewed to see if they had discerned the purposes of the
study, fully debriefed as to the purposes and manipulations
of the study, thanked for their participation, given a hand-
out describing the study, and dismissed.
Questionnaire . A questionnaire (see Appendix A) was
designed to check on the operation of the independent mani-
pulations and tap possible alternative explanations for the
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results of the study. Part of the questionnaire consisted
of six seven-point rating scales. The first scale asked
whether or not the self-administration of points affected
the subject's attention in the experimental task. The end
points of the scale were labeled 1 (increased attention) and
7 (decreased attention). The purpose of this scale was to
lend credence to the cover story that the study was, in
fact, concerned with whether or not the administration of
points can affect attention. The second scale asked sub-
jects how they would rate their performance on the basis of
chance. The end points of this scale were labeled 1 (below
chance) and 7 (above chance). It was hypothesized that sub-
jects in the random order conditions would rate their ability
at chance. However, subjects in the patterned order condi-
tion, if the manipulation was successful, should rate their
ability as better than chance. This argument is based on
the premise that subjects v^ho felt that they had discerned
a pattern in the sequence of illumination of the feedback
lights should feel that they were performing at better than
a chance level. The third question asked subjects whether
the other subject (model) differed in ability from the sub-
ject. The end points of this scale were labeled 1 (very
different) and 7 (not very different). This question was
included to check on a possible equity theory (Adams, 1967)
interpretation of the data. Masters (1968) has noted that
self-reinforcement can be used to maintain a proportional
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ratio between inputs into a task and payoffs one receives
if the subject perceives his performance as different from
another person's performance. The fourth question provided
"
a manipulation check on the operation of the model simi-
larity manipulation. It asked the subject how similar in
attitude was the subject they watched in her rating of the
importance of doing well on the task. The end points of
this scale were labeled 1 (quite similar) and 7 (quite dis-
similar). The final rating scale asked how important doing
well had become on the task after having completed the task.
The end points of this scale were labeled 1 (very important)
and 7 (not very important). This scale was included to de-
termine whether or not the subjects' subjective evaluations
of the importance of the task changed as a function of their
experience with the task. Such changes could alter the
operation of the model similarity manipulation. The ques-
tionnaire also asked the subjects to state how many points
the model gave herself when correct in order to determine
if the subjects had understood the model's behavior. Sub-
jects were also asked if they sav/ a pattern to the sequence
of illumination of the feedback lights to assess the opera-
tion of the task instructions manipulation. Subjects re-
sponded to this question by checking either a "yes" or a
"no." Open-ended questions asked subjects if other tech-
niques might be more effective in increasing attention in a
repetitive task, how they determined the amount of self-
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reinforcement they deserved, and to indicate what they
thought the experiment was all about.
Statistical analyses. Inspection of the data indi-
cated that, contrary to expectations, subjects frequently
rewarded themselves below as well as above the model •s
standard. Obviously, self-reinforcement below the model's
standard is as much a rejection of the model's standard as
self-reinforcement above her standard. However, simply
averaging the data would lead to a situation where the mean
would approximate the standard displayed by the model.
Therefore, it was necessary to utilize some type of trans-
formation which would more accurately reflect acceptance
or rejection of the model's self
-reinforcement standard.
With this in mind, it was decided to use an absolute devia-
tion from the model's standard as the major dependent meas-
ure. These data were then analyzed by means of an analysis
of variance. The scaled questionnaire data were also
analyzed by means of the analysis of variance procedure.
RESULTS
Self-reinforcement data
Before reporting the results of the analysis of vari-
ance for the self-reinforcement data it is necessary to add
one caution. Plotting the frequency of the scores, it was
found that there was a bimodal distribution of the data.
This bimodality appeared to be caused by subjects in each
condition opting to use the maximum number of points possible
30
whenever they were correct. Unfortunately there was no
transformation available which would correct for this prob-
lem as well as no non-parametric statistics appropriate to
the data. Therefore, it was decided to utilize an analysis
of variance since this procedure is particularly robust
(Myers, 196?). However, interpretation of the results of
this analysis of variance should be treated with caution.
Table 1 reports the results of the analysis of vari-
ance computed for the deviation score data. Inspection of
Table 1 indicated that the only significant effect was that
1 about here
of trials (F = 6.12, 9/504 df, p<.001). The main effects
of model similarity and task instructions (patterned versus
random order) as well as all interactions failed to reach
statistical significance.
Table 2 presents the cell means for all conditions.
The results of a t-test for correlated scores indicated a
significant decrease (t = 3.57, df = 59, p<:.00l, two-
tailed) in modeling from the first correct trial (X = 3.B2)
to the last correct trial (X = 4.SS).
Insert Table 2 about here
Inspection of Table 2 indicates that the ordering of
the overall means for the between-subjects cells tended to
support the experimental hypotheses for the patterned order
groups. That is to say, within the patterned order task
instruction condition, the similar model group showed more
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TABLE 1
SWMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ABSOLUTE
DEVIATION FROM THE MODEL »S STANDARD
SV df MS
Between Ss
A (model similarity) 1
B (task instructions) 1
AB 1
S/AB 56
Within Ss
T (trials) 9
TA 9
TB 9
TAB 9
ST/AB 504
22.43
39.53
15S.11
66.39
10.06
1.71
.57
1.16
1.64
<1
<1
2.3S
6.12*
1.04
<1
<1
*p <.00l
I
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modeling (I = 3.73) than the dissimilar model group
(X = 5.14). However, the ordering of the means within the
random order task instruction condition was exactly the oppo-
site. In the random order condition, the dissimilar model
group showed more modeling (X = 3.60) than the similar model
group (X 4.24). Generally, the ordering of the between-
subjects means are in line vath the experimental hypotheses
for the patterned order condition but not for the random or-
der condition. However, it should be noted that none of the
differences among the means were statistically significant.
Questionnaire data
The questionnaire data (see Appendix A) were analyzed
by means of separate analyses of variance for each question.
The data from the questions concerning the effect of self-
reinforcement on attention, the subject's ability in terms
of chance, the difference in ability betv/een the model and
the subject, and the importance of doing well on the experi-
mental task all failed to yield statistically significant
results. Table 3 presents a summary of the analyses of vari-
ance for the questionnaire data. It is important to note
that many of the Fs for the non-significant data were less
Insert Table 3 about here
than 1.00, indicating that the variables these questions
were designed to tap probably were not affected by the ex-
perimental manipulations.
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The data from the question asking whether or not the
model was helpful to the subject in making the predictions
yielded a significant interaction between model similarity
and task instructions (F = 4.19, 1/56 df, p<.05). Table 4
presents the cell means for this data.
TABLE 4
CELL IvlEANS FOR HELPFULNESS OF MODEL DATA^
Patterned Order Random Order
Instructions Instructions
Similar Model 3. BO 2.60
Dissimilar Model 3.07 3.93
^The larger the number, the more helpful the model v/as
to the subject v/hen the subject made his predictions.
Inspection of this table indicates that in the pat-
terned order condition the model was seen as more helpful
when the model was described as similar as opposed to dis-
similar (X = 3 .Bo, model similar, patterned order; X = 3.07,
model dissimilar, patterned order) . This ordering is re-
versed for the random order condition. In this condition the
model was seen as more helpful to the subject in making his
predictions when the model was dissimilar (X = 3.93) than
when the model was seen as similar (X = 2.60). This inter-
action was subsequently analyzed by means of Duncan's
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Multiple-Range Test (Duncan, 1955). The results of this
analysis indicated that within the similar model groups the
patterned order task instruction condition differed from the
random order task instruction condition (p<.05). In addi-
tion, it was also found that the similar model group differed
from the dissimilar model group in the random order task in-
struction condition (p<.05).
Questions designed to assess the operation of the inde-
pendent variable manipulations indicated that the model
similarity manipulation was successful while the patterned
versus random order manipulation was unsuccessful. There was
a strong main effect of model similarity (F = 27.82, I/56 df,
p <.001) with the similar model perceived as similar in atti-
tude concerning the importance of doing well on the task
(X = 2.80) and the dissimilar model perceived as dissimilar
(X = 5«73). In order to test whether or not the task instruc-
tions (patterned versus random order) manipulation was suc-
cessful, subjects were asked if they had noticed a pattern
to the illumination of the feedback lights. Since the re-
sponse to this question involved checking either "yes" or
"no," the data were inappropriate for an analysis of variance.
Therefore, a X^ analysis was conducted using the frequency
of "no" responses as the dependent variable. The results
indicated that there v/ere no differences among the four ex-
perimental groups (X^ = .451B, df = 1). Thus, on the basis
of this question it v/as concluded that the task instructions
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manipulation failed to operate as anticipated.
Finally, responses to the question designed to ascer-
tain whether or not the subjects understood the amount of
self-reinforcement selected by the model indicated that sub-
jects v/ere aware of how many points the model selected.
DISCUSSION
While the results of the analysis of variance con-
ducted on the self
-reinforcement data failed to yield any
significant effects of either model similarity or task in-
structions (patterned versus random order), the ordering of
the cell means indicated some support for the experimental
hypotheses. The hypotheses were supported in the patterned
order condition with the similar model group modeling the
self-reinforcement behavior of the model more than the dis-
similar model group. In the random order condition, it was
predicted that there would be no differences between the
model similarity groups. However, the trends appeared to
indicate that the dissimilar model group showed more modeling
than the similar model group. Nevertheless, the differences
among these means were non-significant. Overall, the only
significant effect in the self-reinforcement data was the
main effect of trials. The questionnaire data indicated that
the model similarity manipulation operated as expected v/hile
the task instruction (patterned versus random order) manipu-
lation did not. Other questionnaire data indicated that the
3a
independent variables did not differentially affect either
the subjects' perceptions of the influence of self-
reinforcement on attention, the subjects' perceptions of
their abilities in terms of chance, the subjects' perceptions
of any differences in ability between themselves and the
model, or the subjects' perceptions of the importance of
doing well on the task. However, data concerning whether or
not the model was perceived as helpful to the subject in
making his predictions yielded a significant interaction
between model similarity and task instructions. This inter-
action indicated that the similar model was perceived as
more helpful than the dissimilar model in the patterned or-
der conditions while the dissimilar model was perceived as
more helpful than the similar model in the random order con-
ditions.
Due to the lack of significant effects, it is impos-
sible to either support or disconfirm the experimental
hypotheses which prompted this study. Obviously, it can be
argued that the failure of the instructions manipulation
negated any hope for an adequate test of the Social Compari-
son formulations, and thus, inconclusive results should be
expected* However, three lines of reasoning argue against
this position. Firstly, the patterning of the means was
generally in line with the hypotheses except for the random
order, model dissimilar condition. Due to the high varia-
bility of the data, it can be argued that the lack of
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significant effects was due to too few subjects rather than
the instructions manipulation. Possibly future research
using a prediction task should use more subjects than were
used in this study.
Secondly, when subjects were regrouped on the basis of
the questionnaire data to yield groups which perceived the
independent variable manipulations appropriately, the pat-
terning of the means was parallel to that of the total data.
In other words the similar model group modeled more than the
dissimilar model group when the task instructions specified
a patterned order to the illumination of the lights. In the
random order condition, the dissimilar model group showed
more modeling than the similar model group. Since the pat-
terning of the cell means for the regrouped data paralleled
that of the total data, it is possible that the total data
reflected the actual behavior of the subjects rather than a
failure of the task instructions manipulation. Unfortunately,
when the data were regrouped, the resulting number of sub-
jects was too small for statistical analysis.
Finally, it is possible that the failure of the task
instructions manipulation check to yield significant results
was due to the wording of the question itself. The pilot
data indicated that a single statement asking subjects
whether or not they had seen a sequence to the illumination
of the lights was sufficient to differentiate the patterned
and random order task instructions conditions. In the study
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Itself, no such difference was found. However, subjects re-
ported in the post-experimental interview that they had
searched for a pattern but were unable to find one. From a
Social Comparison position, belief in and search for a pat-
tern during the series of trials should be sufficient for
the arousal of social comparison processes. In sum, it is
argued that the failure of the task instructions manipula-
tion check may not have reflected a failure of the task
instructions manipulation. The reasons for this argument
include (l) the patterning of the overall between-subjects
means both before and (2) after regrouping the data, and
(3) the possibly inappropriate wording of the task instruc-
tions manipulation check.
The trials main effect (F = 6.12, 1/504 df, p< .001)
holds some interest. Further data analysis of the trials
data indicated a significant (t = 3.57, df = 59, p<.001,
two-tailed) change in amount of self-reinforcement adminis-
tered with more modeling on the first trial (X = 3.S2) than
the last trial (X = 4.S8). There are two plausible explana-
tions for this trials effect. Firstly, it may be argued
that subjects confronted v/ith this particular prediction
task initially opted to follow the model and then after some
experience aecided to develop their own criteria for self-
reinforcement. The second argument simply states that sub-
jects became bored over the series of trials, and thus, opted
to ignore the self-reinforcement behavior of the model. Since
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it is impossible to distinguish between these possible ex-
planations on the basis of the data, the trials main effect
remains largely unexplained.
Frequently, post-experimental questionnaire data can
provide important clues as to v/hy a particular study either
succeeded or failed. In addition, questionnaire data often
provides evidence concerning the plausibility of alternative
explanations of the data. Unfortunately, such is generally
not the case in this particular study. Nevertheless, the
data from the question asking v;hether or not the model was
helpful to the subject when the subject made his predictions
held some interest. As noted earlier, the means for this
scale indicated that the similar model was more helpful than
the dissimilar model for subjects receiving the patterned
order task instructions. Hov/ever, the opposite relationship
held for the random order task instructions condition. This
patterning of means was similar to that found for the betv/een-
subjects variables of model similarity and task instructions
in the self-reinforcement data. It is possible that the sub-
jects who found the model helpful when subsequently making
their own predictions also found the model helpful when de-
termining how much self-reinforcement v;as appropriate. In
order to test such a hypothesis, a correlation between per-
ceived helpfulness of the model and amount of self-
reinforcement selected was computed. Due to the nature of
the rating scale with higher numbers indicating greater
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helpfulness and lower self-reinforcement scores indicating
greater modeling, a negative correlation was necessary to
support the hypothesis. Unfortunately, the obtained corre- '
lation was -.iS (df = 58, p>.05) indicating no relationship
between perceived helpfulness of the model and amount of self-
reinforcement administered.
Since the questionnaire data failed to provide any sig-
nificant clues as to why the independent variables failed to
have a significant effect on the amount of self-reinforcement
subjects gave to themselves, it is necessary to seek possible
explanations from two other sources. Firstly, one must re-
examine Social Comparison theory in order to determine
whether or not the experimental operations of the study ade-
quately fulfilled the conceptual formulations of the theory.
Secondly, one must re-examine the nature of the task utilized
to see if there might be some aspect of the task which might
have contributed to the obtained results.
Festinger (1968) has discussed his conceptualization
of the social versus non-social standard which an individual
selects in order to determine the appropriateness of his
opinions and/or abilities. According to Festinger, this di-
mension may be viewed as having some type of physical reality
at one end and a social reality at the other. An attitude
concerning a physical reality may be empirically tested. As
an example, Festinger noted that if one felt that the ice
covering a pond was too thin, one could test the thickness
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of the ice by a number of techniques. In other words, one
may empirically determine the correctness of his attitude by
actually testing it in the physical world. At the other end
of the dimension is social reality v/hich cannot be empiri-
cally tested. For example, one may believe that a given
examination was too difficult after failing it, but there is
no real physical test of whether or not the examination was
too difficult. In this situation, Festinger argues, one
seeks out others who share this belief in order to gain some
additional support for the belief. In the present study, it
was argued that the instructions stating that the order of
illumination of the feedback lights was random constituted a
physical reality by which the subject could determine the
adequacy of his performance. This physical reality was chance
performance. Since the subject knew that each trial was a
guess, it was argued that the subject would have no reason
to compare himself with the model in order to determine how
many points a correct response was worth. On the other hand,
subjects in the patterned order conditions were told that
the illumination of the feedback lights followed a definite
pattern. It was argued that these instructions placed the
subject in a situation where he had to perform a series of
trials before he could decide whether or not he had dis-
covered the pattern. However, while searching for the pat-
tern, the subject would have no standard available to
determine how many points a single trial was worth. Therefore,
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it was argued that a subject in this situation would rely on
the behavior of the model in order to determine how many
points each individual trial was worth. The trends in the •.
self-reinforcement data noted earlier appear to support the
idea that the task instructions reflect Festinger's social-
physical reality dimension. On the other hand, since there
were no significant differences among the overall between-
subjects group means, it can be argued that the trends merely
reflect random error. Such a possibility and its implica-
tions both for this particular experimental design and future
designs testing Social Comparison predictions in the modeling
of amount of self-reinforcement must be considered. Since
the between-subject s means were not statistically different
from one another, it is possible that the task instructions
failed to provide a physical-social reality. Specifically,
it could be argued that the patterned order instructions
failed to provide a social reality as Festinger (1955) con-
ceptualized it. In other words, subjects in the patterned
order condition might have felt that the self-reinforcing
behavior of any model (similar or dissimilar) was irrelevant
since they were testing whether or not their predictions fit
into a pattern purportedly determined by some electrical
apparatus. Thus, it may be that the patterned order instruc-
tions actually reflected a degree of physical reality rather
than a social reality. If this were the case there would be
no differences between the task instruction (patterned versus
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random order) conditions since both would reflect a physical
reality. In addition, the presence or absence of a model
would be irrelevant since a comparison other is not considered
when a physical reality is present. Overall, there should
then be no differences among the between-sub jects means. Ob-
viously, if the experimental manipulations do not accurately
reflect the concepts of Social Comparison theory, these ma-
nipulations can operate in the expected manner without pro-
viding a test of the theoretical formulation. Naturally, such
a problem was not foreseen in the design of the experiment.
If the above explanation is accepted, then this study did not
provide a test of the Social Comparison theory predictions.
However, before such an explanation is accepted, one caution
should be mentioned. If the instructions manipulation had
merely reflected a physical reality instead of both a physical
and a social reality, one would not expect the model to have
any effect on the selection of self-reinforcement. However,
data from the pilot research indicated that subjects in all
model conditions exhibited significantly more modeling of the
model's amount of self-reinforcement than did subjects in a
no model control condition. Regardless, any difference be-
tween model conditions and no model controls may be ascribed
to some type of general modeling influence. Therefore, fu-
ture research should investigate whether or not task instruc-
tions concerning the illumination of a set of lights really
reflects Festinger's (1968) physical-social reality dimension.
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As mentioned above, the second source of clues as to
why the independent variables failed to influence the amount
of self
-reinforcement selected concerns the task itself. The
above discussion alludes to problems with the task. However,
its emphasis is on whether or not the experimental instruc-
tions accurately reflect the conceptualizations of the social-
physical reality dimension. Before examining the task,
however, it is important to point out the difficulties in-
herent in developing a single task which can be varied along
a physical-social reality dimension. After much reflection,
it was determined that the only objective, non-social stand-
ard feasible was in terms of probability. Chance is a mathe-
matical concept which is empirically determined and has no
social referent. In addition, a probability task such as the
one used can be varied so that the standard can be changed
from chance instructionally to one which is no longer chance
by having a subject search for a pattern in the illumination
of lights. When looking for a pattern, there is also an em-
pirically determined standard as discussed above; whether or
not one finds the pattern. In addition, one can easily intro-
duce a social referent (a model) whose similarity to the sub-
ject can be varied along an attitudinal dimension. Thus, it
was argued that a probability task could be modified in such
a way as to reflect the extremes of the social versus objec-
tive, non-social standard dimension as stipulated by Festinger
(1955) as well as varying the similarity of the model.
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Unfortunately, the use of a probability type of task
has a serious disadvantage. In the minds of many subjects
a probability task such as the one used utilizing predictions
of an event is perceived as simply guessing. When one
guesses, one is right or wrong. If one is right, he deserves
something and if one is wrong he doesn't. Numerous strate-
gies enter into the situation when one is determining how
much he deserves when correct or incorrect. One simple
strategy was to award oneself all the points when correct
and none when incorrect since one is just guessing. Another
more elaborate strategy involved giving oneself half the
number of points possible on any correct trial since one had
a 50-50 chance of being correct on any given trial. Regard-
less of the specific strategy used to determine the amount
of self-reinforcement, the use of strategies implies a fail-
ure to transmit to the subject the fact that he can rely on
the model for cues as to appropriate self-reinforcement. It
is possible that the use of a prediction task implied some
type of guessing even though the subject received instruc-
tions to the contrary. Possibly only a prediction task runs
the risk of being reduced, in the subject's mind, to merely
guessing. If that is the case, then future research could
possibly investigate other types of tasks to see if they
fulfill the requirements of Festinger's (I96B) physical-
social reality dimension and still be amenable to the intro-
duction of a model.
4S
When research fails to provide clear cut answers to
experimental hypotheses, it is incumbent upon the researcher
to point out directions for future research. The ideas pre-
"
sented in this paper point to two directions for future re-
search. The first direction would be to conduct research
using various tasks which reflect Festinger's (1955) physical-
social reality. Since it is difficult to develop a single
task which reflects this dimension, it is possible to utilize
a series of tasks which reflect the end points of the dimen-
sion. If such research indicated that modeling of self-
reinforcement does not vary as a function of task, it would
be possible to argue that any obtained differences among the
cell means actually reflect the operation of the independent
variables separate from any specific task. The second
approach to the problem of developing tasks which reflect
the physical-social reality dimension would be to utilize a
normative standard as the physical reality. Bandura and
Whalen (1966) utilized such an approach. However, in this
paper it was argued that the normative standard implies some
type of social comparison since a social standard is a sta-
tistical average of all individuals along a particular dimen-
sion. However, it is possible that the concept of norm has
evolved in such a way that many consider a norm to be a
standard. If it can be empirically demonstrated that a nor-
mative standard is considered to be some type of physical
reality, then its utilization in research designed to test
49
Social Comparison predictions for the modeling of self-
reinforcement would be appropriate. Nevertheless, without
such an empirical demonstration, which is the case with the
Bandura and Whalen (1966) study, the use of a normative
standard as a physical reality is inappropriate.
In sum, although the trends of the data partially sup-
ported the hypotheses which prompted this study, the lack of
significant results indicate that much more research is neces-
sary before one can state whether or not social comparison
processes are important in the modeling of rate, standard,
or amount of self-reinforcement. Suggestions for future re-
search on this problem center around a clearer specification
of the social-physical reality dimension and the types of
tasks used to operationalize this dimension. As Bandura
(1971) has noted, the role of self-reinforcement in the pos-
sible maintenance of deviant responses as well as the possible
role of self-reinforcement in resistance to extinction make
self-reinforcement an important topic for future research.
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APPENDIX A
Post-experimental Questionnaire
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QUESTIONNAIRE
How did awarding points affect your attention in the task?
1 2 3 4 5 6
"*y~"
increased no decreased
attention change attention
Do you think that other techniques might be more effectivein maintaining your attention in a repetitive task*? (If
"yes," please specify.) ^. v-lx
In terms of chance performance, how would you rate vour
ability m this particular task?
12 3 4 5 6 7
below chance above
chance chance
In terms of ability in performing the task, how different
was the subject you v/atched from you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very average not very
different different
How much did watching the other subject help you in making
your predictions?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at neutral quite a
all lot
According to the information I gave you, how similar was the
other subject in her rating of the importance of doing well
on this task?
1234567
quite neutral quite
similar dissimilar
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Haying completed the task, how important did doing well onthis task become?
12 3 4 5 6 7
"^n^ average not very
important important
How many points did the other subject give herself when she
was correct?
points
Did you see a pattern in the sequence of illumination of thelights in the FEEDBACK (top) row?
.yes
no
Hov; did you determine how many points were appropriate when
you gave yourself points?
Please indicate what you think this experiment was all about.


